

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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PROJECT ZRRIFLE
HANDWRITTEN NOTES
ASSASSINATION PROJECT

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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HARVEY/EX 1 R371

6/25/75

9KJ1

Project ZRRIFLE

1994
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA MEMO
AS SANITIZED
23 JUN 94
(S) (A)
(S) (B)
(S) (C)

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~not~~ ~~ports~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the development of a clandestine network of agents in accordance with requirements derived on the clandestine sources~~ ~~the National Security Agency~~ since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as background needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~for the development of a clandestine network of agents in accordance with requirements derived on the clandestine sources~~ Division D in 1962 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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Automatic declassification (1), (2), (3)
Data susceptible to determination

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period requirements ~~from NSA~~ became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D ~~collective~~ ~~could not~~ ~~conduct the activity~~ ~~in the NSA~~ ~~in the NSA~~ could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 ~~through the Chief of the Broadcasting Board of Control~~ ~~the Chief of the Board of Censorship~~, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ ~~to~~ sporadically by ~~Chief of the Board of Censorship~~, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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3

Rubin annual salary : \$ 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
Rubin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees &
engaged in Zorille activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

- 1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.
- 2) Our own experience (~~Chatterbox~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (~~Chatterbox~~) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/ go to the pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/ firm high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.
- 3) Maximum security:
 - a. Kurbak only (e.g., what does ~~Chatterbox~~ know?); no approach to other Soviet agencies.
 - b. Within Kurbak, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officiating, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCi officially advised?
 - c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with commo (non-station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannel re ~~trips~~ (except forward).
 - d. No PA's, or intermediaries; rigid case-officiating, from start to finish.
 - e. No approach to officials of foreign govt. ~~SECRET~~
 - f. No use of any agent who ^{JUN 24 1915} ^{IA} ever worked for a Soviet govt. agency. Training by opposition would be needed.
 - g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., ~~Marked~~) in the search.
 - h. Stand-by list of Kurbaks who can

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freed to travel [6]

Platylabus coll.

- 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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10) ~~Confidential~~ recommended. ~~Code name~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities (all archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~all~~ ^{all} ~~personnel~~ ^{personnel} involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~Stable~~ ^{stable} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Dangers of standbys.

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red 1 - 25/1 - Eye (ation
"The Magic Button"

Parotics Büro

"for a living"

RIS 201 cover

Condon - Bankruptcy - No Star

eyes - Jim A.

not a TSD problem

Contradict from U-2

3 apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
a confession of weakness.

- El Benefactor - assumptions

Example 3 "wrong"

Transmittal of 3/13/75

Cherry RFB - Memo

Translating machine - 1/1/75
base branch - 1/1/75
phases - (1/1/75)

Concept - Fear

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Quatrasia

26/1 - AS - Foreign DCI - Matter -

No file Review -

1. Select proper open to run

2. Place in

Max. 2

3. Security Rules

B-WITH-AS-3

4. Trust lines

Sid - Review

5. Last Resort - Brakes

Spill to 6 - 1/1/75

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6. no ~~other~~ ~~projects~~ (9
7. no projects or papers
except per cones.
8. Principal Agent - ~~if~~ (~~Marked~~) ? -
~~AT~~ Project Draft LCH -
ticket 1500 - from RB.
mark spot again. Still at
project - also Diske
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who & where -
Must know before
we can spot -
11. Case officering
12. ~~cover for~~ ~~cover for~~ ~~cover for~~
~~RB or other~~ ~~cover for~~ ~~cover for~~
13. ~~had~~ ~~clashes~~ ~~of~~ ~~RB~~ ~~cover~~ ~~for~~
~~cover~~ ~~for~~ ~~cover for~~ ~~cover for~~
~~are~~ ~~blamed~~ ~~for~~ ~~cover for~~
- 7d list - Remember

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